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I. INTRODUCTION
A rulebook of civil procedure is a compilation of brief rules which guide
attorneys in conducting civil actions - from the drafting of the initial
complaint' or answer 2 all the way through trial
3 and post trial activities.4
Indeed, representing a client zealously within the bounds of the law
5
must include a thorough knowledge of the rules of civil procedure as cases
can be won or lost on the application or misapplication of these rules.
6
Mastery of the civil rules cannot be overemphasized, and one cannot be
deceived into believing that procedural mandates are always easy to
understand, follow, or apply.
The rules of civil procedure, seemingly straightforward, can be mis-
interpreted due to attorney inattentiveness. However, a more pervasive
reason for the misapplication of procedure is that the rules may be cloaked
in mystery with hidden meanings and traps for the unwary. There are
I For rules governing the preparation of a complaint, see OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(a),
7, 10.
2 Rules addressing the drafting of an answer included OHIO R. Civ. P. 7, 10,
12.
3See generally OHIo R. CIV. P. 38-53. These rules cover trial practice.
4 See, e.g., OHIO R. Civ. P. 59, 60.
5 OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILIrY EC 7-1 (1988).
6 Statement by J. Patrick Browne, Professor of Civil Procedure at Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, Ohio (May 23, 1989).
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several reasons for this. First, state rules of civil procedure are often
adopted almost verbatim from the federal rules7 without significant anal-
ysis of how they will fit into the state scheme. This leaves the meanings
of such rules to evolve gradually in the courts. Secondly, courts in various
districts may analyze the same rule in different ways and create confusion
as to the proper application of the rule.8 Even a state supreme court may
not always interpret a rule of civil procedure in a consistent manner.9
Finally, a rule may be written unclearly, ambiguously, or without spec-
ificity so that it is open to various interpretations. One rule which has
suffered and still is suffering from misinterpretation and misapplication
is Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 54(B), 10 judgment upon multiple claims
or involving multiple parties, the subject of this note.
The following discussion, an analysis of Rule 54(B), will attempt to
accomplish several tasks. First, the note will briefly describe the history,
nature, and purpose of the rule. Secondly, it will analyze the major aspects
and requirements of Rule 54(B). The analysis will emphasize the facets
of the rule which have often been misconstrued and explain the proper
interpretations where they exist. Third, the note will suggest ways to
combat misuse and misinterpretation of Rule 54(B) and will propose an
amended version which will alleviate some of the confusion in the rule's
application.
I Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 2 with OHIO R. Civ. P. 2; compare FED. R. Cirv. P. 20
with OHIo R. Civ. P. 20; compare FED. R. Civ. P. 31 with OHo R. Civ. P. 31; compare
FED. R. Crv. P. 54(B) with OHio R. Cirv. P. 54(B). The preceding sets of state rules
are almost word-for-word copies of their federal counterparts.
8 Compare Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3rd
Cir. 1975) (held that reasons for entering Federal Rule 54(B) language of "no just
reason for delay" on a judgment order must also be on the order) with Schwartz
v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968) (reasons for
"no just reason for delay" language not mandatory on the judgment order, just
suggested).
9 See, e.g., Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St. 3d 92, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989); Chef
Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St. 3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989);
General Accident Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.A., 44 Ohio St. 3d 17, 540 N.E.2d266 (1989). These cases demonstrate that the Ohio Supreme Court is not consistent
in its application of Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 54(B). See infra notes 214-30
and accompanying text.
10 Rule 54(B), judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties, as
adopted on July 1, 1970 by the Supreme Court of Ohio and the 108th Ohio General
Assembly states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determi-
nation that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of such deter-
mination, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all of the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims
or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
OHio R. CIv. P. 54(B). For a comparison of the original first draft of the rule, see
Draft Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 OHIO B. 89 (1969). The 1970 version as
adopted and the current rule are identical.
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II. HISTORY, NATURE, AND PURPOSE OF RULE 54(B)
A. Origin of Rule 54(B)
Ohio Civil Rule 54(B) went into effect July 1, 1970,11 along with the
new Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure which replaced the Ohio Code of Civil
Procedure. The 1970 rules were modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure at the suggestion of the Ohio Supreme Court.12 An appointed
Rules Advisory Committee 13 used the Federal Rules as an outline, adopted
the Federal numbering system, and made the "modifications, omissions,
and supplements" it deemed desirable.' 4 It supposedly conducted a careful
rule-by-rule study before accepting a new rule.' 5 However, due to the
almost word-for-word similarity between some of the Ohio rules and their
federal counterparts,' 6 the rapid promulgation of the rules, 17 and the
misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with some of the
rules, one wonders if the Committee considered all the ramifications of
each adopted federal rule on the Ohio court system.
" Ohio Civil Rule 54(B) has no application to cases in which the judgment of
the trial courts were entered prior to the effective date of the new rules, even if
the appeal occurred after that date. Latsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., 27 Ohio St. 2d
303, 306, 272 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1971).
"The basis for the Ohio rule was the 1961 amended version of Federal Rule
54(B). J. KLEIN, P. BROWNE & J. MURTAUGH, BALDWIN'S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE
§ T 25.01 (1988). The 1961 Federal rule read as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such deter-
mination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however des-
ignated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all of the parties shall not terminate the action as
to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(B) (1961 version). Federal Rule 54 was amended as of August
1, 1987, but 54(B) was not altered. See generally Annotation, Modern Status of
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) Governing Entry of Judgment on Multiple
Claims, 89 A.L.R. FED. 514 (1988); Annotation, Necessity of a Statement of Reasons
Underlying District Court's Decision to Grant Certification Under Rule 54(B) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 A.L.R. FED. 772 (1977). See also Note, The
Finality of Partial Orders in Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(B), 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 637 (1989).
3 This group consisted of twenty-eight judges and eleven attorneys. Draft Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 OHIO B. 89 (1969).
14 Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIO B. 727, 728
(1970).
15 Id. at 729.
16 See rules cited supra note 7.
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Although fashioned after its federal counterpart, Ohio Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(B) must be primarily interpreted and understood through
Ohio case law especially since the rule has evolved for twenty years in
the Ohio system and has developed some characteristics distinct from the
federal rule.' This is not to say that scrutiny of the federal rule or com-
parable state rules is never illustrative or helpful in analyzing Ohio Rule
54(B). 19 Though it may be helpful to examine the purpose and interpre-
tations of other 54(B) rules absent Ohio authority, one must understand
how the Ohio courts have uniquely applied and misapplied Rule 54(B)
with special emphasis on the required certification 2 language of "no just
reason for delay" 21 and on the rule's effects on multiple claims. 22
11 By June 20, 1968, the Supreme Court had directed the formation of the Rules
Advisory Committee. The Committee presented the first draft rules to the Court
in January, 1969. Corrigan, supra note 14, at 728-29. By July 1, 1970, the new
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure were in effect.
1B Despite many similarities and almost verbatim recitations of federal rulesin the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the two procedure systems do vary. Oneleading legal publisher noted this in an advertisement for a treatise on the federal
rules stating that "because of the great variance between the new Ohio Rules ofCivil Procedure and the Amended Federal Rules, we do not recommend sole
reliance on any of the Federal practice sets in interpreting the new Ohio Rules."Advertisement for Ohlinger's Federal Practice, 42 OHo B. p. preceding 727 (1970).
Specifically with regard to Rule 54(B), it is important to note that the rules fordetermining appealability differ in the federal system from the method used inOhio. Bernbaum v. Silverstein, No. 79AP-719 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1979)(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
19 One court has suggested that where the particular Ohio Rule and its com-parable federal rule are virtually identical, the courts' application of the Ohio
rule should, absent inapplicable jurisdictional questions, be guided by the federalinterpretations of the federal rule. Abbeyshire Constr. Co. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n, 39 Ohio App. 2d 125, 129, 316 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1974). The Ohio Rule54(B) cases have sometimes looked to the Federal Rules or to other states' 54(B)
rules for aid in interpretation especially soon after the adoption of the Ohio CivilRules. In Amato v. General Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 253, 255, 423 N.E.2d452, 454 (1981), the Supreme Court of Ohio examined the North Dakota version
of Rule 54(B) in order to determine Ohio Rule 54(B)'s applicability to class actions.Similarly, in Way v. Wallach, 30 Ohio App. 2d 180, 181, 283 N.E.2d 823, 824(1972), the court examined federal cases for support for the proposition that absent
a determination of no just reason for delay, an order on one or more but less than
all the parties in a lawsuit cannot be final.
10 The process of placing Rule 54(B) language of "no just reason for delay" on
a judgment is referred to as certification and this term will be used in this note
to refer to that process.
21 Onio R. Civ. P. 54(B).
22 See infra notes 159-230 and accompanying text.
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B. Nature and Purpose of Rule 54(B)
Ohio Rule 54(B), like many of the current Ohio rules, was promulgated
in order to facilitate the prompt and effective modernization of the Ohio
court system.23 Rule 54(B)'s contribution to the facilitation of justice is
that it allows final judgment as to one or more but less than all of the
claims or parties in case,2 4 a practice not generally allowed under the
Ohio Code of Civil Procedure,25 but one which is needed in the new Civil
Rule System which allows more liberal joinder of parties and claims. As
was stated recently by the Ohio Supreme Court in General Accident In-
surance Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America:
Historically, an appeal could not be taken until all claims and
parties in an action had been disposed of. Permitting only one
appeal from any one action was adequate at a time when most
litigation involved only two parties and one claim. However,
as joinder of parties and claims became more prevalent, it be-
came to be accepted that to deny an immediate appeal from
the disposition of identifiable and separable portion of a highly
complex action might result in an injustice. 26
Therefore, one of the main purposes of Ohio Rule 54(B) is to allow portions
of a case to be appealed before the entire case is resolved. However, to
limit one's understanding of the goals of Rule 54(B) to this one purpose
is to misunderstand, as have many attorneys and courts, the true nature
and purpose of the rule. Indeed, "[w]hatever may be said of the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure, it was not one of their purposes to encourage or to
permit unnecessary fragmented appeals .... ,,27
2 Corrigan, supra note 14, at 728. As Judge John V. Corrigan, Chairman of
the Rules Advisory Committee, noted, the new rules of procedure represented
"the most thorough revision in history ... and substantially remove[d] the old
formalities of the pleadings" in order to "zero in on the basic issues of lawsuits"
thus "eliminating delay, unnecessary express, and other impediments to the ex-
peditious administration ofjustice." Id. at 727-28. The court system modernization
was effectuated through the Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution
which was adopted by the voters of the state in May, 1968. See Text of Modern
Courts Amendment, 41 Omo B. 343 (1968). Section 5(B) of the Amendment em-
powered the supreme court to prescribe the rules for governing procedure in Ohio
courts. Draft Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 OHIO B. 89 (1969).
- OHmO R. Crv. P. 54(B).
21 See, e.g., Branch v. Dick, 14 Ohio St. 551 (1863). Before 1970, the courts of
Ohio held that generally there was no right to appeal part of a case. However,
there is some evidence that part of an action was appealable in some instances.
Logue v. Wilson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 132, 134, 341 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1972) noted
that 54(B) was adopted in part because before 1970 it was difficult to determine
whether a judgment disposing of less than all of an action was an appealable
order.
26 44 Ohio St. 3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266, 270 (1989) (quoting 20 C. WRIGHT &
C. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2653 (1983)).
17 Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Carl M. Geupel Constr. Co., 29 Ohio St. 2d 184, 187,
280 N.E.2d 922, 924-25 (1972). This case which correctly concluded that summary
judgment for less than all of the claims or parties was not appealable without
Rule 54(B) certification is typical of many early Rule 54(B) cases because it relied
solely on the rule to reject the appeal. This type of analysis helped promote the
misconception that the rule alone rendered a partial order final and appealable.
1991]
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In order to fully understand the nature of Rule 54(B) and its role in
the appellate process, it is necessary to note that the rule does not stand
in isolation but operates in conjunction with and only after the application
of Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution28 and Section
2505.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. 29 Together these two sections specify
that the appellate courts only have jurisdiction to review judgments 0 or
final orders3' of the inferior courts. 32 The Ohio Constitution is the supreme
law of the state and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure cannot change or
diminish any substantive right given by the statutes of the state.33 Thus,
in order for Rule 54(B) to apply to part of a case which has been adju-
dicated, the partial decision must first be a final order or judgment. In
other words, the rule itself cannot determine which parts of cases qualify
for Rule 54(B) treatment, but can only, after a portion of a case is final,
decide whether to allow the otherwise final order to be appealed.3 4 The
effect of Rule 54(B) is "purely procedural. 35
28 In part, Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution grants appellate courts
"such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or
reverse judgments or final orders of the [inferior] courts." OHIO CONST. art. IV,
§ 3(B)(2).
z' In part, Section 2505.02 states that "an order that affects a substantial right
in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment ...
is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or
without retrial." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Baldwin 1988). There are four
other Section 2505.02 definitions of final order, but three of them will rarely, if
ever, apply to Rule 54(B) situations and one of them will pose no Rule 54(B)
problem. Browne, The Supreme Court and Civ. R. 54(B): A Noble Effort to Interpret
Chef Italiano's General Accident Insurance, PRO/GRAM, Nov. 1989, at 1, 3 [here-
inafter Noble Effort].
10 The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure define judgment as "a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies as provided in R.C. 2505.02." (emphasis added)
OHIO R. Crv. P. 54(A). The emphasized language became effective on July 1, 1989.
This addition is important because it helps clarify that a judgment under 54(B)
must comply with the finality requirements of Section 2505.02. Even as late as
1988, it was commonly but erroneously thought that partial judgment did not
require "compliance with R.C. 2505.02." J. KLEIN, P. BROWNE, & J. MURTAUGH,
supra note 12, at § T 25.01.
" OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Baldwin 1988).
'2OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(b)(2).
3 Statement by J. Patrick Browne, Professor of Civil Procedure at Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, Ohio (May 23, 1989).
Determining whether a partial judgment is final is a two-step analysis. The
order must first be final under R.C. § 2505.02, then the court must take a second
step to decide if 54(B) language is required. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Insurance
Co. of N.A., 44 Ohio St. 3d 17, 21, 540 N.E.2d 266, 271 (1989). Indeed, "[albsent
a final order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02, Civ. R. 54(B) is never reached." Noble v.
Colwell, 44 Ohio St. 3d 92, 98, 540 N.E.2d 1381, 1386 (1989).
15 Alexander v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 49 Ohio St. 2d 158, 159, 359 N.E.2d 702,
703 (1977). Although Alexander correctly concluded that a Rule 54(B) order was
not immediately appealable unless it was also final under R.C. § 2505.02, scant
attention was paid to this part of the case because the court applied 54(B) in a
way that accorded with the common erroneous understanding. Noble Effort, supra
note 29, at 2.
[Vol. 39:237
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Since the finality requirement derived from the Ohio Constitution
36
and the Ohio Revised Code37 applicable to Rule 54(B) hinders "piecemeal
litigation, avoids delay, and ... promotes judicial economy,"38 Rule 54(B)
cannot be viewed as indiscriminately allowing wholesale appeals. Rule
54(B) is, in fact, an exception to the general and still valid rule that
"when there are multiple claims in an action ... or when there are mul-
tiple parties, a court's order is not final until there is an entry adjudicating
all the claims ... of all the parties."
39 Only if there is a "hardship or
injustice" to the party for whom a partial judgment was rendered can the
court enter final judgment on part of a case 40 by declaring that there is
"no just reason for delay. '4 The true aim of Ohio Civil Rule 54(B) is to
resolve the tension created between the state's policy against piecemeal
appeals and the possible injustice sometimes created by the delay of ap-
peals. 42 Although Rule 54(B) is often misunderstood as a rule which alone
facilitates the appeals of parts of cases, in actuality it was intended to
prevent fragmented appeals 43 by converting otherwise final and appeal-
able orders into interlocutory orders.44 One court noted that the policy
considerations of rendering orders interlocutory, a function performed by
Rule 54(B), consist of the following:
1) the rule prevents parties from engaging in costly delaying
tactics at trial by appealing each adverse ruling as it is entered;
2) the losing party on a particular motion may ultimately pre-
vail at trial, and not seek an appeal, thus saving appellate
36 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(b)(2).
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Baldwin 1988).
38 State v. Torco Termite Pest Control, 27 Ohio App. 3d 233, 234, 500 N.E.2d
401, 402 (1985).
39 T.R. Barth & Assocs. v. Marginal Enters., Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 218, 222,
356 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1976). Ohio courts have consistently refused to review non-
final orders or orders disposing of fewer than all of the claims or parties, "in the
interest of considering all the errors at one time after judgment." Inabnitt v.
Salzer, No. C-850740 at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1986) (LEXIS, States library,
Ohio file). Ohio still has a strong policy against piecemeal appeals despite 54(B).
See, e.g., State ex. rel. Celebrezze v. K & S Circuits, Inc., 6 Ohio St. 3d 354, 453
N.E.2d 653 (1983); Bernbaum v. Silverstein, 62 Ohio St. 2d 445, 406 N.E.2d 532
(1980).
40 48 Ohio App. 2d at 222, 356 N.E.2d at 769.
41 OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(B). Declaration of "no just reason for delay" is not a mere
formality. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. Orders which are other-
wise final but which are not given certification are interlocutory, cannot be ap-
pealed, and are "subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and rights and liabilities of all the parties." OHIO R.
Civ. P. 54(B).
42 Alexander v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 49 Ohio St. 2d 158, 160, 359 N.E.2d 702,
703 (1977).
4 See, e.g., Poole v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 931 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1982)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
"Browne, Applying Civil Rule 54(B), PRo/GRAM, June 1989, at 1 [hereinafter
Applying 54(B)].
1991]
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court time; 3) a single appeal in which all objections to the
trial court's ruling are raised will be more efficient than nu-
merous appeals, each requiring its own set of briefs, record,
oral argument, and appellate opinion; 4) by avoiding interlo-
cutory appeals, the trial court can move rapidly and will nothave to be stalled while waiting for the court of appeals to rule
on some point.45
Unfortunately, many early cases and some later cases discussed Rule54(B) and its ramifications without reference to the related constitutional
and statutory provisions.46 This helped create the misconception that Rule54(B) alone permitted "final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties.."47
III. APPLICATION OF OHIO RULE 54(B)
In order for Rule 54(B) to operate, three prerequisites must be met.First, there must be multiple claims and/or parties of which some but not
all of the claims and rights of parties have been adjudicated. 41 Second,
the decision which is being appealed must be a final order.49 Third, thetrial court must expressly determine that there is "no just reason fordelay."0 There have been misunderstandings and misapplications of Rule54(B) in all three areas. In category one, the confusion revolves around
the meaning of what constitutes a claim for relief under Rule 54(B).51Next, the finality requirement is not always understood or followed, thus
creating confusion as to the role of Rule 54(B).5 2 Finally, attorneys and
courts have often been under the incorrect assumption that certification
automatically and magically converts any partial judgment into a final
appealable order.53 This section will examine the certification require-
ment, mention Rule 54(B)'s applicability to multi-party actions, define
what constitutes a claim for relief for the purposes of Rule 54(B), anddiscuss the rule's operation in multi-claim actions. Finality under R.C.§ 2505.02 and its requirements will be treated as necessary under each
section.
4 General Elec. Supply Co. v. Warden Elec., Inc., 38 Ohio St. 3d 378, 382, 528
N.E.2d 195, 198 (1988).See, e.g., Jarrett v. Dayton Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 20 Ohio St. 3d 77, 486N.E.2d 99 (1985); Way v. Wallach, 30 Ohio App. 2d 180, 283 N.E.2d 823 (1972).These cases reveal little about the actual operation of Rule 54(B) as the analysesare limited to dismissals based merely on lack of an express determination of "nojust reason for delay" without reference to constitutional and statutory require-
ments for finality.47 Oio R. Civ. P. 54(B).
4 Id.
49 See supra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.5 Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St. 3d 92, 99, 540 N.E.2d 1381, 1387 (1989).51 See infra notes 167-95 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
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A. Certification54
The important certification requirement of Rule 54(B) is the portion of
the rule which is its essential feature. In evaluating and understanding
certification, one must consider the correct interpretation and application
of the phrase "upon an express determination of no just reason for delay,"5
the effect of certification or lack thereof, the reasons why the required
language has created confusion, and the ways in which attorneys or courts
can better utilize certification to effectuate the goals of the rule.
1. Compliance with the Certification Requirement
Under Rule 54(B), in a multi-claim or multi-party action, "the court
may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay. '56 Proper use of the rule requires that the determination
only be made in certain instances and by certain language.
In order for a judge to be allowed to make an express determination of
"no just reason for delay," Rule 54(B) must first be applicable. 5 7 A two-
step analysis can help one to ascertain whether a Rule 54(B) situation
exists. First, it is necessary that the case have multiple parties and/or
claims and that the court has adjudicated only part of the case. 58 Second,
See supra note 20. The requirement of certification is discussed first because
it is pertinent in all cases in which 54(B) may apply and because for many years
it was misinterpreted.
Omo R. Civ. P. 54(B).
Id. (emphasis added.) As the word "may" indicates, the decision of whether
or not to make a determination of "no just reason for delay" is one within the
sound discretion of the trial judge. See Ollick v. Rice, 16 Ohio App. 3d 448, 451,
476 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (1984); Fair v. School Employees Retirement Sys., 44 Ohio
App. 2d 115, 120, 335 N.E.2d, 868, 872 (1975). A nonexclusive list of factors
considered by federal judges in exercising their Rule 54(B) discretionary power
includes:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2)
the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by
future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the re-
viewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time;
(4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result
in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous
factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the
time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3rd Cir. 1975).
One significant shortcoming of the Ohio Rule 54(B) cases is the paucity of dis-
cussion on what actually constitutes "no just reason for delay."
17 The emphasis in this section is on certification. Cases used to discuss the
application and misapplication of certification may or may not be valid under the
proper interpretation of Rule 54(B).
"I See Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Deppen, 65 Ohio St. 2d 65, 418 N.E.2d 399
(1981). In this case, the appellant tried to claim that a full summary judgment
for the appellee was not a final appealable order because the journal entry did
not contain the 54(B) language. The court correctly noted that since all the rights
of all the parties had been adjudicated, Rule 54(B) was inapplicable. Id. at 66,
418 N.E.2d at 401.
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the partial adjudications must be final orders under R.C. § 2505.02.69
Systematic use of the two-step process can help determine if Rule 54(B)
applies in many situations, but it is still sometimes difficult to decide if
an express determination may be declared.
Courts have generally agreed that certification is not an option avail-
able to the judge when: summary judgment as to one party in a lawsuit
is denied;60 only some of the claims are adjudicated but all of the re-
maining ones are rendered moot;61 liability is established, but a ruling
on the damages is still pending; 2 the action is for forcible entry and
detainer 3 or; the remaining claim is against a "John Doe" defendant who
has not been served. 4 Rule 54(B) also does not apply when: the case is a
criminal action;65 the trial judge fails to resolve all of the claims and
instead ignores the remaining claims;66 a motion to dismiss for failure to
join an indispensable party is overruled; 67 although it appears otherwise,
there is really only one claim in an action;68 and the partial order is one
declaring that an action may be maintained as a class action.69 The fact
that trial judges have inserted the "no just reason" language in these
59 See supra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Hinkle v. Akron Novelty Co., 40 Ohio App. 3d 162, 532 N.E.2d 772
(1987). Rule 54(B) does not apply as denials of summary judgments are not final
and appealable under R.C. § 2505.02. Id. at 163, 532 N.E.2d at 774. That 54(B)
may have no application to any order overruling a motion for summary judgment
is readily apparent since such orders do not purport to enter final judgment as
to any party or to any claim. Thompson v. Axt, No. 80AP-90, slip op. at - (Ohio
Ct. App. May 8, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at 3). This is because a
denial of summary judgment means that there are genuine issues of material
fact that still need to be determined. OHio R. Crv. P. 56(C).
61 See, e.g., Wise v. Gursky, 66 Ohio St. 2d 241, 421 N.E.2d 150 (1981); Har-
leysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Santora, 3 Ohio App. 3d 257, 444 N.E.2d 1076 (1982).
In these cases, the claims became moot by a partial order which made the entire
judgments final under R.C. § 2505.02. Rule 54(B) was not needed because no
claims were left pending. See, e.g., Wise, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 243, 421 N.E.2d at
152.
62 See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. BPS Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 3, 446 N.E.2d
181 (1982). The issues of liability and damages are not multiple claims for relief,
but only two aspects of one claim for relief so Rule 54(B) is not applicable. See
cases cited supra note 191.
6 See, e.g., Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Auth. v. Jackson, 67 Ohio St. 2d 129,
423 N.E.2d 177 (1981); Smith v. Wright, 65 Ohio App. 2d 101, 416 N.E.2d 655
(1979). The reason that Civ. R. 54(b) does not apply to forcible entry and detainer
cases is because the civil rules specify that they cannot be used in such cases.
OuRo R. Civ. P. 1(c).
14 See, e.g., Harris v. Plain Dealer Publ. Co., 40 Ohio App. 3d 127, 532 N.E.2d
192 (1988).
61 See, e.g., Middleton v. Jackson, 8 Ohio App. 3d 431, 457 N.E.2d 898 (1983).
Although juvenile proceedings are quasi-criminal, Rule 54(B) has been held to
apply to these type of proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Wylie, No. 45952, slip op.
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 2 Ohio App. 3d 79, 440 N.E.2d 823 (1981).
67 See, e.g., Bank Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Rubicon Cadillac, Inc., 11 Ohio St. 3d 32,
462 N.E.2d 1379 (1984).
See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
IAmato v. General Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 253, 423 N.E.2d 452 (1981).
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situations and the fact that appellants have succeeded in obtaining ju-
risdiction in the appellate courts in some cases demonstrates that both
attorneys and judges are often perplexed as to when to request or add
certification.
The aforementioned cases generally fall into two categories. First, Rule
54(B) may not apply because the action is already appealable solely by
application of R.C. § 2505.02.70 Second, the rule may be inapplicable
because the partial order is not final under R.C. § 2505.02.71
Many cases in which Rule 54(B) could apply involve appeals to the
Ohio Courts of Appeals or the Ohio Supreme Court in which a party tries
to appeal an order or decision on part of a case which does not contain
the express determination of no "just reason for delay. '72 Although these
somewhat simple cases appear to be unanimous in holding that the ab-
sence of certification where needed renders an otherwise final order in-
terlocutory,73 they have nevertheless contributed to the misunderstanding
of Rule 54(B). The problem with these cases is that they dismiss appeals
solely on the lack of required language and do not discuss whether the
partial decisions are otherwise final under R.C. § 2505.02.74 While this
analysis promotes judicial economy and efficiency and is sufficient to
dismiss the appeals, the absence of at least a cursory statement noting
whether the partial adjudication was or was not final under R.C. § 2505.02
creates the impression that only the requirement of Rule 54(B) has to be
met for a partial order to be appealable. These cases have helped con-
tribute to the misguided popular belief that the trial court can "convert
an interlocutory order into a final appealable order by adding the magic
phrase 'no just reason for delay. ' '75 The appellate courts should at least
mention in all Rule 54(B) cases that final appealable orders must satisfy
R.C. § 2505.02 as well as Rule 54(B).
"A finding of 'no just reason for delay' pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B) does
not make appealable an otherwise non-appealable order."76 Rule 54(B) is
designed to be used only in those situations where there are multiple
claims or parties, and there is an otherwise final adjudication of less than
all of the claims or rights of the parties.7 7 This proposition is not obscure,
71 See cases cited supra note 61.
71 See cases cited supra note 60.
71 See, e.g., Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Carl M. Geupel Constr. Co., 29 Ohio St.
2d 184, 280 N.E.2d 922 (1972); Wellborn v. K-Beck Furniture Mart, Inc., 54 Ohio
App. 2d 65, 375 N.E.2d 61 (1977); Logue v. Wilson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 132, 341
N.E.2d 641 (1975); Shore v. Chester, 40 Ohio App. 2d 412, 321 N.E.2d 614 (1974).
72 An interlocutory order is one which is not final. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
731 (5th ed. 1979).
14 See, e.g., Wingate v. Hordge, No. 77AP-797, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8,
1977) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (launched into discussion of Rule 54(B)
without first determining if the order was final under R.C. § 2505.02).75 Applying 54(B), supra note 44, at 1.
76 Douthitt v. Garrison, 3 Ohio App. 3d 254, 444 N.E.2d 1068 (1981).
77 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. BPS Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 3, 4, 446 N.E.2d 181,
181 (1982).
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but has been reiterated many times.78 As was stated in O'Neils Dep't Store
v. Taylor:
An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final
appealable order. The trial court's determination of 'no just
reason for delay' is always subject to appellate review and re-
versal, if erroneously recited; the certification does not auto-
matically convert a judgment which is not final into a final
appealable order. A truly final order is one that, between the
parties, ends the litigation and leaves nothing for the trial court
to do as to those parties but to execute the judgment.7 9
What Rule 54(B) certification actually does is to "convert a final appeal-
able order into an interlocutory order by omitting the magic phrase from
the judgement entry" in order to conserve the judicial time and effort of
the appellate courts.80
The misconception as to the function of certification has arisen often
in cases involving summary judgement."1 This has occurred in part be-
cause while denials of summary judgments for fewer than all of the parties
in an action can never be final and appealable, 2 certification can make
the grant of summary judgment as to less than all of the parties in an
action appealable pursuant to Rule 54(B). 3 Buckeye Union Co. v. IBM, 4
involving the denial of summary judgment as to one party in a multi-
party case, is a typical example of the confusion surrounding Rule 54(B).
When the party tried to appeal, the court of appeals began its analysis
correctly by stating that the overruling of a motion for summary judgment
was not final and appealable under R.C. § 2505.02.15 However, the court
also stated "[mloreover, the order does not contain the language that
there is no just reason for delay pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B)" and "therefore,
appellee's motion to dismiss is well taken. 8 6 This last statement insin-
uates that the lack of certification had some bearing on the denial of the
appeal. The correct analysis is that since there was no final order under
R.C. § 2505.02, Rule 54(B) had no application to the case. Rule 54(B)
should not have been mentioned at all or the opinion should have been
careful to state that the rule did not apply. This careless remark is yet
another example of the misconception that certification alone can render
an interlocutory order final and appealable.
78 See, e.g., Korodi v. Minot, 40 Ohio App. 3d 1, 531 N.E.2d 318 (1987); Sheets
v. Antes, 14 Ohio App. 3d 284, 470 N.E.2d 931 (1984); R & H Trucking, Inc. v.
Occidental Fire & Casualty Co., 2 Ohio App. 3d 269, 441 N.E.2d 816 (1981).79 No. CA-7219, slip op. at 2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1987) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file) (citations omitted).
10 Applying 54(B), supra note 44, at 1.
1 See cases cited supra note 60. See also Moeller v. Butela, Nos. 53082, 53108,
slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
82 See supra note 60.
13 See, e.g., Bethesda Hosp. & Deaconess Ass'n v. Montgomery, 27 Ohio App.
3d 376, 501 N.E.2d 642 (1985).
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Another feature of court opinions which has contributed to the mis-
interpretation of the proper utilization of Rule 54(B) certification is ref-
erence to the "no just reason for delay" language as a "magic phrase" or
"magic words."' 7 Repeated reference to certification in this manner may
well have contributed to the notion that the language of Rule 54(B) has
independent power to convert nonfinal orders into final ones. The courts
could better employ phrases such as "the required language," "the man-
datory phrase," or "the necessary words" to refer to the certification lan-
guage.
Just as court opinions in Rule 54(B) cases should always state that the
requirements of R.C. § 2505.02 have been met before the rule may apply,
they should never try to utilize Rule 54(B) when it is otherwise not
applicable. The problem is that just because part of a case is final pursuant
to R.C. § 2505.02 does not mean that it automatically qualifies for the
certification which is needed to make it appealable. There must be good
reasons for the courts to ignore the general policy against piecemeal
appeals8 and grant certification. Unfortunately, a reading of the Ohio
cases reveals that there is no specific discussion on what actually con-
stitutes a good justification to support a determination of "no just reason
for delay" in situations in which partial orders are otherwise final and
little discussion on when the trial judge abused his discretion in adding
or not adding the required Rule 54(B) phrase. 9 It has been noted that
Rule 54(B) certification should only be added in the infrequent harsh case
and not entered routinely as courtesy or accommodation to counsel.90
What type of situation is the infrequent harsh case is not readily dis-
cernable from the case law. Generally, an order disposing of all claims
against one of multiple parties warrants certification 9' unless the claims
against one party are so intertwined with the claims against another
party that one appeal at the end of the entire case makes more efficient
use of the courts.9 2 The absence of reasons in the cases has contributed
to the misconception that certification is a pro forma requirement. In fact
Rule 54(B) language should only be added after a careful consideration
as to why one appeal at the end of the entire case would not satisfy justice.
Since judical economy and efficiency are goals of Rule 54(B),93 presumably
any situation in which these objectives are not hindered by an immediate
appeal would justify certification. However, the understanding of Rule
54(B) would be enhanced if the cases discussed the particularities of
grants or denials of the phrase "no just reason for delay."
9 4
- See, e.g., Freeman v. Holzer Medical Center, No. 88 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27,
1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Martz v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 1363,
Slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
8See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
Alex Fodor Realty Co. v. Newman, No. 37006, slip op. at - (Ohio Ct. App.
June 29, 1978) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at 1-4).
90 Id. at - (LEXIS at 7).
91 See, e.g., Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St. 3d 86, 541
N.E.2d 64 (1989).
9 See, e.g., Ollick v. Rice, 16 Ohio App. 3d 448, 476 N.E.2d 1062 (1984).
93 See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(B).
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One way to increase the understanding of what actually qualifies as
the infrequent harsh situation which justifies the immediate appeal of
part of a case would be to require the trial judge to place upon the judg-
ment order the reasons why he added or refused to add certification. At
least one federal district court has adopted this approach and has held
that an appeal must be dismissed and the certification vacated when the
trial court fails to enumerate its justification for employing Rule 54(B).9
Other federal courts, while not making reasons mandatory, suggest that
it is highly recommended for the trial court to state its reasons for adding
certification to a partial order.96 A dissenting judge in one Eighth District
Court of Appeals case has suggested that Ohio follow the mandatory
federal procedure. He declared that the "unsolicited incantation of the
statutory language standing alone, will not brew a magic potion that
vests our court with jurisdiction."9 7 "Our authority to review," he stated,
"must not rest on the whim of the lower court when it makes an unsup-
ported determination that there is no just reason for delay."981 Thus far
the Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether reasons
should be mandatory on a judgment entry which contains Rule 54(B)
certification. This approach would be a valuable addition to Rule 54(B)
jurisprudence because it would create a body of case law which would
help attorneys understand when certification of an otherwise final order
is allowable. More importantly, it would aid the appellate court in de-
termining whether the trial court had abused its discretion by adding or
failing to add the "no just reason for delay language." The value of such
an approach is illustrated by examining the Ohio Fourth District Court
of Appeals treatment of partial orders which come up on appeal without
certification.
In an attempt to reduce the strictness of the Rule 54(B) requirements,
the Fourth District routinely states that where an appeal is rejected due
to the absence of Rule 54(B) certification, it will allow the appellants to
submit the same briefs on immediate reappeal if the trial court on remand
adds the phrase "no just reason for delay."99 In these opinions, the court
95 See Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3rd Cir.
1975). The court reasoned:
A proper exercise of discretion under Rule 54(b) requires the district court
to do more than just recite the 54(b) formula of "no just reason for delay."
The court should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its
decision to grant 54(b) certification .... It is essential ... that a reviewing
court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions
arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and
more boiler-plate approval phrased in appropriate language but unsup-
ported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law.
Id. at 364.
See, e.g., Schwartz v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270 (2d
Cir. 1968). See generally Annotation, Necessity of a Statement of Reasons Under-
lying District Court's Decision to Grant Certification Under Rule 54(B) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.L.R. FED. 772 (1977).
7 Alex Fodor Realty Co. v. Newman, No. 37006, slip op. at - (Ohio Ct. App.
June 29, 1978) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at 8).9 Ild.
See, e.g., Dot Sys., Inc. v. Adams-Robinson Enters., Inc., No. 1883 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 25, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Miller v. C.K.L., Inc., No.
8612 (Ohio Ct. App. July 12, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
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does not even discuss whether such certification may be appropriate. This
approach contributes to the Rule 54(B) confusion. First of all, it suggests
that certification is a mere formality. Secondly, it could be interpreted by
the trial court as a directive to add the certification automatically. If the
trial court were required to state reasons why certification is or is not
appropriate, parts of cases would not be indiscriminately parlayed back
and forth between the courts. It would aid judicial economy and efficiency
if the trial court was required to do one of the following when 54(B)
certification is requested: 1) place certification and its justifications on
the judgment entry; or 2) deny certification, place the reasons for denial
in the record, and state in the judgment entry that the cause is contin-
ued. 00
Just as there has been confusion as to when the judge has the option
of using Rule 54(B), the requirements to fulfill certification have produced
misconceptions. Certification is a strict requirement. 10 1 Using the rule's
phraseology of "no just reason for delay"'1 2 or words which are equivalent
such as "no genuine reason for delay,"'
103 
"no further entry required,"'0 4
"[t]his entry shall be considered a final entry,"'0 5 or "no just reason to
delay enforcement or appeal hereof,"106 the judge must actually place
certification on the judgment entry.10 7 The intention or even announce-
ment of a decision to grant certification without actually recording the
language on the judgment entry will not satisfy the certification require-
ment of Rule 54(B). °8 The rule is simple. Absent the express determi-
nation of no "just reason for delay" on the judgment entry, a decision will
- See P.L. Grant Realty v. Bowles, No. 1427, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
14, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at 1). In this case, the court specifically
stated on the judgment entry "and this cause is continued." Id. This left no doubt
that, absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, there was no final appealable
order on the part of the case on which judgment had been rendered.
I1 Vanhoose v. Board of Educ. of Gallia Local School District, No. 87 CA 23 at
- (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at *2). The
strict requirement is that, despite the reasons, the absence of certification on the
judgment order makes an otherwise final partial order nonappealable. Id.
102 OHIo R. Civ. P. 54(B)
10fTrent v. Slane, No. 81AP-148, slip op. 1077, 1078 (Ohio Ct. App. April 28,
1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
104 Owens v. Coll, No. 441, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1982) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file).
1015 Hawker v. Jackson, No. 445, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1982)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). The court observed that while the certification
language did not have to be "parrotlike," it did have to convey the same meaning
as "no just reason for delay" Id.
106 Graham v. Harbour, 20 Ohio App. 3d 293, 294, 486 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1984).
107 Morrison v. Firestone Photographs, Inc., No. 77AP-339, slip op. at - (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 6, 1977) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at 2). This case illustrates
the strictness of the certification requirement. The court recognized that the trial
judge undoubtedly intended to dispose of the counterclaim but still rejected the
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not be considered a final judgment or a final appealable order.10 9 In order
that a possible Rule 54(B) situation is not overlooked or ignored by the
court, it is prudent for the attorney to move for Rule 54(B) certification
rather than relying on the court to correctly ascertain and utilize the
rule. Although a strict requirement, in certain instances, the omission of
Rule 54(B) language can be corrected so that an otherwise final partial
order can be appealed.
If the trial court intended to add certification language to an order but
forgot, the judgment entry may be amended nunc pro tunc,110 to add the
phrase "no just reason for delay" in order to make the order comply with
Rule 54(B). This type of corrective entry may be added by the court on
its own initiative,"' but a prudent attorney should move for such an
order." 2 Thus, nunc pro tunc entries have been entered upon joint stip-
ulation of both parties 31 or after appellees filed objections to a judgment
order because certification had not been given.114 Attorneys cannot correct
the final judgment entries themselves.1"' In jurisdictions where the at-
torney is required to prepare the judgment entry for the judge's signature
and the judge has indicated a willingness to add certification on a part
of a case, it has been held that when the attorney neglects to add the
required Rule 54(B) language to the judgment entry and the judge there-
after fails to add it, a nunc pro tunc entry will be denied." 6 Only the trial
court has the authority to amend a judgment entry. Declaring in the
appellate court that an appeal should be allowed because lack of certi-
fication was an oversight at the trial level, whether true or not, does not
give the appellate court the right to amend a trial court judgment entry
to add certification. 1 7 Nunc pro tunc orders are retroactive, and the appeal
time does not start to run until the date of the amended entry.'"I Moreover,
101 T. R. Barth & Assocs. v. Marginal Enters., Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 218, 223,
356 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1976). Cf. Worthington Nursing Home v. Creasy, 4 Ohio
App. 3d 92, 94, 446 N.E.2d 841, 843-44 (1982) (suggesting court's manifestation
of intent not to contemplate further proceedings might suffice for certification).
110 Nunc pro tunc literally means then for now. It only applies to omissions in
the record which were really had but omitted due to inadvertence or mistake.
BLACK's LAW DIcTioNARY 964 (5th ed. 1979).
"I It is unlikely that without prompting the trial court would amend an order
on its own to insert Rule 54(B) language.
112 See, e.g., Thompson v. Seinsheimer, No. C-850168, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 12, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). The court had intended to
add but had omitted certification from the judgment entry.
"' White v. White, 48 Ohio App. 2d 72, 72-73, 355 N.E.2d 816, 817 (1975).
,,4 Hardesty v. Cabotage, 1 Ohio St. 3d 114, 115, 438 N.E.2d 431, 433 (1983).
"I See Provident Bank v. Fish, Nos. C-830537, C-830552, A-8202603, slip op.
at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 16, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). In this case,
the attorney actually added the phrase "no just reason for delay" on the finaljudgment entry. When the court discovered that the language was not its own,
it had it stricken from the record. Id.
"I See, e.g., South High Dev. v. Weiner, Lippe & Compley Co., No. 81AP-323,
slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 2, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
7 Ollick v. Rice, 16 Ohio App. 3d 448, 452 N.E.2d 1062, 1068 (1984).
'"Lin v. Reid, 11 Ohio App. 3d 232, 235, 464 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1983).
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Rule 54(B) language has been added on a partial judgment as late as a
year after the judgment entry."9 However, the best practice for an attor-
ney to follow is to move for certification before a judgment entry is re-
corded, because the nunc pro tunc method can only remedy inadvertent
mistakes of omission by the trial court.
2. Effects of Certification and Noncertification
Once a judgment is properly certified under Rule 54(B), part of an action
becomes a final judgment. The losing party is permitted to take an im-
mediate appeal while the prevailing party can attempt to enforce the
judgement. 1"o Certification is intended to ensure that parties to an action
know when an order is final so they can calculate the time period in which
they have to appeal.12' Parties must be careful to have their attorneys
read the judgment entries. In Kiss v. Allstate Insurance Co. a 1983 case
in which the trial court entered an express determination of "no just
reason for delay," both defendants argued on appeal that they were not
informed of the finality of the orders so that they should be allowed to
appeal even though their appeals were filed in an untimely manner.
122
The court pointed out that there is no procedural requirement that parties
be served with final orders. Thus, even though the rule was harsh, the
appeal was dismissed as untimely. 23 As long as the rules "are as they
are,"' 124 the court said, the parties must check the judgment orders to
ascertain if certification rendered part of a case appealable.
The failure of the trial court to grant certification on a judgment entry
for an otherwise final part of a case has certain inescapable consequences.
First, that part of the multi-claim or multi-party action is not a final
appealable order, 25 and the "order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and rights and liabilities of all the parties."12" 6 If an appeal is
attempted on a decision lacking certification, then that appeal is
premature 127 and must be dismissed sua sponte by the appellate court
128
119 See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Cleveland, No. 42008, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
120 T. R. Barth & Assocs. v. Marginal Enters., Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 218, 222,
356 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1976).
121 Pokorny v. Tilby Dev. Co., 52 Ohio St. 2d 183, 186, 370 N.E.2d 738, 740
(1977).
122 Kiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Ohio App. 238, 461 N.E.2d 923 (1983).
123 Id.
124 Id.
121 T. R. Barth & Assoc. v. Marginal Enters., Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 218, 223,
356 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1976).
126 Omo R. Civ. P. 54(B). See also Sakian v. Taylor, 18 Ohio App. 3d 62, 480
N.E.2d 822 (1984); Pitts v. Ohio Dep't Transp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 423 N.E.2d
1105 (1981).
127 Logue v. Wilson, 45 Ohio App. 3d 132, 135, 341 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1975).
128 Wingate v. Hordge, No. 77AP-797, slip op. at - (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1977)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at 3).
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for lack of jurisdiction. 129 Courts often express sympathy for the plight of
Rule 54(B) appellants' 30 who appeal despite lack of certification, and ex-
asperation at the Rule 54(B) dilemma,' but their only alternative is to
dismiss. As one court noted, "Court rules are made to be followed both
by the court and by counsel, not ignored. If a court feels its rules do not
reflect the proper course of action, it should amend them, not ignore
them."" 2 The misuse and misinterpretation of Ohio Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 54(B) indicates that it is one of those rules which needs to be
amended.
B. Ohio Rule 54(B) and Multi-Party Actions 33
Although subject to the general misconceptions regarding certification
requirements,'3 4 generally Rule 54(B) is fairly easy to apply in multiple-
party cases."35 The typical cases involve one plaintiff suing various de-
fendants in one lawsuit 136 or several plaintiffs suing one defendant."17
Cases may also involve several plaintiffs and more than one defendant.138
Further complications arise when there are multiple parties on each side
and multiple claims.139 However, the simple multiple-party actions usu-
ally require only the typical Rule 54(B) analysis which requires an af-
firmative answer to the following questions: 1) is this a multiple party
action?;140 2) does the judgment for less than all of the parties in the action
129 Way v. Wallach, 30 Ohio App. 2d 180, 182, 283 N.E.2d 823, 824 (1972). This
is lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Brown v. Wonderful World Publ. Co., No.
75AP-495 slip op. at - (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1975) (LEXIS, States library, Ohiofile at 3). Only one case has allowed an appeal on part of a case despite the lack
of certification. See Gardner v. Energy Research and Dev. Corp., No. 1416 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 11, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
11o See Kiss v. Allstate, 10 Ohio App. 3d 238, 461 N.E.2d 923 (1983).
"I Alward v. Zimmerman, No. 34304, slip op. at - (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23,1975) (LEXIS, States Library, Ohio file at 2). This exasperation was expressed
by the statement "Once again we must dismiss the appeal for want of a final
appealable order pursuant to Civil Rule 54(B)." Id.
132 Shore v. Chester, 40 Ohio App. 2d 412, 414, 321 N.E.2d 614, 617 (1974).
133 Although 54(B) as applied specifically to multi-party actions has not con-
tributed significantly to the rule confusion, its use in this regard is discussed
briefly here because a major function of 54(B) is to render a cause of action against
only one of many parties in a lawsuit final and appealable while the rest of the
case is still pending.
'3 See supra notes 54-132 and accompanying text.
1"5 Applying 54(B), supra note 44, at 2. See also Ollick v. Rice, 16 Ohio App.
3d 448, 451, 476 N.E.2d 1062, 1068 (1984).
136 See, e.g., Jarrett v. Dayton Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 20 Ohio St. 3d 77, 486
N.E.2d 99 (1985) (wrongful death action against two doctors and a hospital);
Sakian v. Taylor, 18 Ohio App. 3d 62, 480 N.E.2d 822 (1984) (negligence action
against thirteen defendants).
137 See, e.g., Way v. Wallach, 30 Ohio App. 2d 180, 283 N.E.2d 823 (1972).
138 See, e.g., Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Carl M. Geupel Constr. Co., 29 Ohio St.
2d 184, 280 N.E.2d 922 (1972).
139 See infra notes 159-230 and accompanying text. This section is an exami-
nation of the complications which arise when multiple claims are involved in the
54(B) analysis.
140 Omo R. Ctv. P. 54(B).
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dispose of an entire cause of action against those parties for whom judg-
ment is entered?; 4 1 and 3) has the Rule 54(B) certification been given?14
2
Sakian v. Taylor 43 illustrates a simple and typical Rule 54(B) multi-
party situation. Plaintiff Peter Sakian, who was injured when the bleach-
ers at a high school function collapsed, sued the school board and twelve
other defendants for negligence. The court granted the board's motion to
dismiss and entered a final order stipulating that there was "no just
reason for delay."1 44 Since the school was completely out of the action, the
order prevented a negligence action against the board. Thus, it was final
under R.C. § 2505.02.141 Rule 54(B) certification made the otherwise final
order immediately appealable.
146
Recently, Chef Italiano v. Kent State University47 demonstrated that
Rule 54(B) still permits final judgments in multi-party cases and its result
is as would be expected from a reading of the earlier Rule 54(B) in multi-
party action cases. Chef Italiano Corp. brought a four-count complaint
against three defendants. 148 Against Kent State it filed two of the counts,
both of which were dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. How-
ever, the court did not add the language of "no just reason for delay" in
its order of summary judgment for Kent State. 49 The supreme court's
dismissal of Kent State's appeal contains an analysis which should serve
as a model for other courts in construing the use of Rule 54(B) in multi-
party actions. The supreme court noted that since the trial court had
dismissed Chef Italiano's only counts against Kent State, no claims re-
mained pending.150 Because no claims remained pending against Kent
State, the action was determined and Chef Italiano was prevented from
obtaining a judgment against the school. Thus, the order was final under
R.C. § 2505.02.15' Only then did the court apply the Rule 54(B) analysis
and conclude that the dismissal of summary judgment, though final, was
not appealable because of the lack of certification. 1 2 The court observed
"[t]his case clearly shows the interrelationship between R.C. § 2505.02
141 In other words, the order must be final under R.C. § 2505.02. See supra
notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
142 OHIo R. Crv. P. 54(B). See supra notes 54-132 and accompanying text.
143 18 Ohio App. 3d 62, 480 N.E.2d 822 (1984).
14 Id. at 63, 480 N.E.2d at 823.
145 An order is final under the code if it affects a substantial right in an action,
prevents a judgment, and determines an action. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2505.02
(Baldwin 1988). R.C. § 2505.02 was not mentioned in Sakian. This is yet another
example of where the court should have, at least in a cursory fashion, stated that
the requirements of R.C. § 2505.02 were met so as not to imply that all that is
required for an order to be final and appealable is compliance with 54(B).
146 See supra notes 59-109 and accompanying text.
147 44 Ohio St. 3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989).
148Id.
149 Id. at 86-87, 541 N.E.2d at 66.
150 Id. at 89, 541 N.E.2d at 68.
15, Id.
112 44 Ohio St. 3d at 89, 541 N.E.2d at 68.
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and Civ. R. 54(B) in ... a multi-party action."1 53 Chef Italiano confirms
what earlier cases15 4 had established, that if an order leaves no claim
pending against one party in a multi-party action, then that order is
eligible for Rule 54(B) certification.
Generally, there is no reason to disallow an appeal on a judgment which
completely removes one party from action pursuant to R.C. § 2505.02 and
Rule 54(B). One situation to be aware of, however, is where the parties
and the issues surrounding them are so interconnected that for purposes
of judicial efficiency, they should be considered together not only at trial
level but also on appeal. 15 5 In Ollick v. Rice,"6 Carol Ollick sued defend-
ants John Rice and Richard Stark in connection with Rice's administra-
tion and Stark's probate of two estates. Ollick sued Rice for breach of
fiduciary duty and Stark for illegal conduct. An order containing Rule
54(B) certification was entered by the court removing Stark as admin-
istrator. Rice was removed as trustee of the estates but certification was
not put on the judgement of that decision. Each defendant appealed.
Rejecting both appeals, the court of appeals ruled that since the rela-
tionships of Stark as administrator and Rice as trustee successor were
interrelated and since there was some joint misconduct, any attempt to
distinguish between the two as multiple parties was impossible.57
In Ollick v. Rice, judicial economy required that the final outcomes be
determined together since many of the same issues would be heard in
two separate trials if Stark was allowed to appeal immediately. Since an
appellate court does not have the authority to add certification to a trial
court order,158 the Ollick court was obligated to keep the claims against
the two parties together by rejecting an immediate appeal although the
order concerning Stark did contain the Rule 54(B) language. This is just
another instance in which the presence of a Rule 54(B) certification does
not automatically render an order appealable.
C. Ohio Rule 54(B) and Multi-Claim Actions
Under Rule 54(B), final judgment may be entered as to one or more
but fewer than all the claims in an action upon an express determination
of "no just reason for delay."1" 9 The task of determining if one "claim"' 6
113 Id. at 90, 541 N.E.2d at 69.
-5 See, e.g., Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Carl M. Geupel Const. Co., 29 Ohio St.
2d 184, 280 N.E.2d 922 (1972). The court stated that the "whole case" as to bothWhitaker and Purdy was "the entire claim of each against Geupel and Aetna."Id. at 185, 280 N.E.2d at 924. Since the trial court granted summary judgmentsfor Whitaker and Purdy on their "whole case," leaving other claims to be resolved,the summary judgment orders were eligible for Rule 54(B) certification. Id. at
186, 280 N.E.2d at 924.
155 Ollick v. Rice, 16 Ohio App. 3d 448, 476 N.E.2d 1062 (1984).
' Id. at 448-49, 476 N.E.2d at 1065.
Ir7 Id. at 451, 476 N.E.2d at 1068.
I' Id. at 452, 476 N.E.2d at 1068.
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or "claim for relief '161 out of many is a final appealable order has become
very complex and has caused so many misapplications of the rule that
one expert has declared that the "confusion ... will not be resolved for
at least a generation.'16 2 The difficulty in applying Rule 54(B) to multi-
claim lawsuits has arisen because there is no common understanding of
what constitutes a proper definition of "claim for relief."
163 In addition,
courts have used various imprecise terms in reference to Rule 54(B) claims
for relief. 164 In order to employ Rule 54(B) in multi-claim cases, one must
properly define a Rule 54(B) claim for relief, apply that definition to the
facts of each case, and remember at all times that no matter what con-
stitutes a claim for relief, it must satisfy the finality requirements of R.C.
§ 2505.02.165 This section will discuss the definition of claim for relief in
conjunction with Rule 54(B), illustrate that whether a "claim" is final
under the rule depends on the definition of claim, and will demonstrate
how the courts' definitions have compounded the bewilderment surround-
ing the application of Rule 54(B) to multi-claim cases.
166
1. Definition of Claim for Relief
The first source of confusion surrounding the meaning of claim for relief
emanates from the fact that a Rule 54(B) claim for relief has been referred
to by many different terms and phrases, and as will be shown, not all are
correct.167 A Rule 54(B) claim for relief has been labeled "cause of ac-
tion," 68 "a single bundle of rights,"'
169 
"one full cause of action,'
' 70
",counts,"'71 "issues,"172 "matters,"'17 3 "theories of entitlement,"'174 "distinct
161 Id.
162 Dirty Tricks with Rule 56: Avoiding the Cincinnati Confession and the Lemon
Trap, PRo/GRAM, Aug. 1989, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Dirty Tricks].
1 Henderson v. Ryan, 13 Ohio St. 2d 31, 233 N.E.2d 506 (1968) (defines claim
for relief in three ways).
' See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
'15 See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Stewart v. Midwestern Indem. Co. 45 Ohio St. 3d 124, 543 N.E.2d
1200 (1989); Nobel v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St. 3d 92, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989); Chef
Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St. 3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989);
General Accident Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.A., 44 Ohio St. 3d 17, 540 N.E.2d
266 (1989).
167 These terms will be analyzed and distinguished throughout this section as
necessary.
8 Amato v. General Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 253, 423 N.E.2d 452 (1981).
119 Adrete v. Foxboro Co., 49 Ohio App. 3d 81, 550 N.E.2d 208 (1988).
170 L.B.J. Inc. v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., No. 46764, slip op.
at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
171 City of Cleveland v. Association of Cleveland Firefighters, No. 45216, slip
op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
172 Bowman v. Owens Corning Corp., No. 83AP-1006, slip op. 2331, 2332 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Americo Fisco v. Un-
derwood, No. 34561, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1976) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file).
173 Russel v. Smith, No. C-86084, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1987)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
174 Baldwin v. Consolidated Controls, No. C-870287, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 3, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at *2-3).
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violations of a right,'' 7 5 "theories of relief,"'76 "distinct branch of a case,"'17
and "demands.' 17 These terms and the phrase "claim for relief' are often
not defined - especially in the early cases.179 The imprecise language
employed by the courts in referring to a Rule 54(B) claim for relief should
be abandoned. Literary variety should be sacrificed for the sake of con-
sistency. The term "claim for relief' should be designated as such and
have one precise meaning, uniformly understood by the courts.
Although there are various definitions of claim for relief,5 0 one expert
has recently suggested that for the purpose of Rule 54(B), a claim for
relief is a "transaction or occurrence,''
a group or aggregate of operative facts, limited to a single
occurrence or affair, without particular reference to the re-
sulting legal right or rights. This so-called factual unit theory
places the emphasis upon the breadth of the transaction or
occurrence rather than the particular right of the plaintiff
which has been infringed .... 182
Under this theory, "[i]f the defendant wrongfully takes plaintiffs chattel
and in the ensuing struggle strikes him ... but one cause of action'
"I Akemon v. Kurtz, No. C-780385, slip op. at - (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1979)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at 2).
176 Shaiker v. American Speedy Printing Centers, No. 89AP-393 at - (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file at *3).
'77 Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St. 3d 92, 95 n.3, 540 N.E.2d at 1381, 1384 n.3(1989).178 Logue v. Wilson, 45 Ohio App. 2d 132, 341 N.E.2d 641 (1975).
179 Id. at 134-35, 341 N.E.2d at 643.
'80 See Henderson v. Ryan, 13 Ohio St. 2d 31, 233 N.E.2d 506 (1968). This case
proposes three definitions of cause of action. The first definition, called the sec-
ondary right definition, equates a cause of action with each legal theory arising
form a wrongful act. The second definition, the primary right definition, is not
concerned with legal theories but equates a cause of action with a wrongful act.
The third theory of cause of action defines it as all rights emanating from a single
set of facts. Id. at 31, 233 N.E.2d at 509.
"'Applying 54(B), supra note 44, at 2.
182 Id. (quoting Henderson v. Ryan, 13 Ohio St. 2d at 34-35, 233 N.E.2d at 509).
' In Ohio it has been said that the words "claim for relief' are synonymous
with "cause of action." Amato v. General Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 253, 256,
423 N.E.2d 452, 454 (1981). Cf. Dirty Tricks, supra note 162, at 4 (inferring that
claim and cause of action are not the same). Whether the two are actually syn-
onymous does not appear to have been settled. For example, it has been stated
that a claim, like a cause of action, refers to an aggregate group of operative facts
which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts. Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d
884, 886 (8th Cir. 1965). See also Harvey Aluminum Inc. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953). However, it has
also been declared that a claim is not the same as a cause of action, Haugland
v. Schmidt, 349 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1984), but is broader than a cause of action.
White v. Land Homes Corp., 251 Md. 603, 607, 248 A.2d 159, 163 (1968). Whatever
the subtle difference, both claim for relief and cause of action are a set of operative
facts giving rise to a right. If cause of action is slightly narrower than claim for
relief, that is immaterial for the analysis here, and if something designated as
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results, since both acts took place during a single occurrence.
' 18 4 Under
other definitions, the plaintiff in the example could have two or three
claims for relief.8 5 The factual unit theory of claim for relief seems to be
a widely accepted definition. For example, one finds support for this def-
inition in the cases of other states,188 in federal cases
8 7 and in the Res-
tatement of Judgments.'8 8 Indeed,
The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make
it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number
of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief... that may
be available to the plaintiff; regardless of the number of pri-
mary rights that may have been invaded; and regardless of the
variations in the evidence needed to support the theories or
rights. The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or
entity which may not be split.188
Under this factual unit definition, a claim for relief cannot be correctly
described for the purposes of Rule 54(B) as an issue, count, matter, de-
mand, theory of entitlement, or theory of recovery because any number
of issues, matters, and theories may arise out of the same set of operative
facts to constitute one claim for relief. While one of many claims for relief
may be made final and appealable under Rule 54(B), the separate issues
or theories which combine to equal one claim for relief, while they can
be adjudicated separately, cannot be made final and appealable until the
entire claim for relief is otherwise final under R.C. § 2505.02. To call a
theory, matter, or issue a claim for relief is to imply that these elements
of a case are subject to the operation of Rule 54(B). This is precisely one
of the misconceptions which has muddled the understanding and appli-
cation of Rule 54(B).
No matter how many issues constitute an action or how many theories
of recovery can be advanced in support of a case arising out of one set of
operative facts, the resulting "bundle of rights"'
9 is only one claim for
184 Henderson v. Ryan, 13 Ohio St. 2d 31, 34-35, 233 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1968).
185 For example, in the chattel example, under the secondary right theory in
which each legal theory entitles a plaintiff to recovery, there would be three
claims for relief under replevin, trover, and battery. Id. Under the wrongful act
theory, the plaintiff would have two claims, one for the taking of the chattel and
one for hitting the plaintiff. Id. at 35, 233 N.E.2d at 509.
18 See, e.g., Twin Coach Co. v. Chance Vought Aircraft Inc., 163 A.2d 278, 285-
86 (Del. Super. Ct. 1960) (defines claim as a group of occurrences which give rise
to a right enforceable in the courts and states "claim" replaces cause of action).
187 See, e.g., NcNellis v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust of Syracuse, 385 F.2d
916, 919 (2d Cir. 1967); Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial, Inc., 317 F.2d 339,
341 (2d Cir. 1963). Both of these cases in construing Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54(B) concluded that "claim for relief' denoted an aggregate of operative
facts giving rise to enforceable rights.
188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
189 Id. at § 24 comment a.
190 This definition of claim for relief is found in Aldrete v. Foxboro Co., No.
54020 at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (claim
of relief defined as a single bundle of rights which arose from a single set of
alleged circumstances).
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relief. For example, the issues of liability and damages are inseparable
parts of one claim for relief.1 1 Likewise, in a case for contempt of court,
the entire claim for relief consists of a finding of contempt and the im-
position of a penalty so that the determination of contempt alone is not
subject to Rule 54(B) certification. 92 There is only one claim for relief if,
as a result of a breach of contract, the plaintiff who is entitled to only
one recovery sues under more than one theory of damages. 9 3 "Unless a
separate and distinct recovery is possible on each claim asserted, multiple
claims [for relief] do not exist".19 4 Recovery for damages and specific per-
formance arising out of one occurrence would constitute two claims for
relief.195
2. Use and Misuse of Transaction Definition of Claim for Relief
Courts have not always understood96 or utilized the "occurrence or
transaction" definition of claim for relief. Moreover, they have tried to
render adjudications of some issues or theories of recovery in one claim
for relief into final appealable orders by granting Rule 54(B) certification.
For example, in R & H Trucking, Inc. v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co.,197
a plaintiff sued a defendant for breach of contract, proposing as theories
of recovery consequential damages, recovery for loss, damages for lost
business, and punitive damages. The trial court found no basis for con-
sequential damages and on the judgment order dismissing these damages,
the court wrote "no just cause for delay."'198 On appeal the appellant
claimed that the order was final and appealable under Rule 54(B) because
the requirements of the rule had been satisfied. The appellate court dis-
missed the appeal stating,
" Courts have often tried to add 54(B) language on an order resolving only
the issue of liability before the issue of damages has been decided. See, e.g., Triplett
v. Rosen, No. 87AP-72 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 5, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ohiofile); Argo Plastics Products Co. v. Cleveland, No. 46664, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App.Nov. 23, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
192 Cooper v. Cooper, 14 Ohio App. 3d 327, 329, 471 N.E.2d 525, 526-27 (1984).The trial court tried to make one issue, the contempt issue, final and appealableby adding certification. The appellate court noted that only one true claim for
relief existed and rejected the appeal despite Rule 54(B) language.
193 R & H Trucking, Inc. v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co., 2 Ohio App. 3d269, 270, 441 N.E.2d 816, 817 (1981). See also Webb v. Budd, No. 88AP-1152(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
"I Applying 54(B), supra note 44, at 4 (quoting Watkins, Bates, Handwork,Gross, Mills & Guthrie v. Upp No. L-84-100 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1984) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file)).
'
5Id. at 3.
' It is not always clear whether or not "claims" arise out of the same set of
operative facts. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Consolidated Controls, No. C-870287 at 4(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). In Baldwin, the
court was uncertain whether the complaint set forth one claim for severance paybased on four theories of entitlement or whether some of the theories arose out
of a different set of facts. It assumed without deciding that only one claim for
relief existed. Id.
197 2 Ohio App. 3d 269, 441 N.E.2d 816 (1981).
I's Id. at 270. 441 N.E.2d at 817.
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[w]here only one claim for relief has been presented, and the
trial court decides one of the legal issues involved in the case,
but does not finally adjudicate the claim for relief, the court's
decision does not become a final judgment subject to appeal
simply by reason of the inclusion of Civ. R. 54(B)... language,
in the court's order."'
99
This is one claim for relief because the plaintiff was entitled to one re-
covery arising out of one transaction, a breach of contract. Although the
court spoke of issues, the plaintiff had actually advanced various theories
of recovery.
In the particularly well reasoned case of Aldrete v. Foxboro,200 the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Appellate District explained the difference
between claim for relief and theories of recovery. In Aldrete, an employee
had asserted eleven "claims" for damages all emanating out of one trans-
action, the employer's alleged wrongful termination of employment. Re-
lying on the "transaction or occurrence" definition of claim for relief, the
court decided that the tort and contract claims were simply inextricably
intertwined theories of recovery in one claim for relief and declared the
trial court's use of Rule 54(B) language did not "divide a single claim
into multiple claims for appellate purposes. °201 The only flaw in Aldrete
is that it referred to the eleven theories of recovery several times as claims
when the point of the case was to explain why the eleven parts of that
case were not claims for relief but theories comprising one claim for relief.
The transaction definition of claim for relief and the approaches in
R & H Trucking and Aldrete make sense in light of the purpose of Rule
54(B) to prevent piecemeal appeals except when injustice would result.
20 2
It certainly does not aid judicial efficiency to allow one party to appeal
four or eleven issues one by one when that party is still embroiled in the
original lawsuit and could just as well appeal the entire claim for relief
when all issues or theories have been adjudicated. In cases such as Aldrete
and R & H Trucking in which it turns out that there is ultimately only
one claim for relief, Rule 54(B) does not even apply.20 "[Rlule 54(B) pro-
vides a procedure for dealing with a situation where 'some ... distinct
branch' of a case is adjudicated but the whole case is not determined.
20 4
Various theories of entitlement or issues in one claim for relief are not
separate and distinct parts of a case.
199 Id. at 271, 441 N.E.2d at 818.
200 49 Ohio App. 3d 81, 550 N.E.2d 208 (1988).
201 Id. at 82, 550 N.E.2d at 209.
202 See supra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
203 Gannon v. Perk, 46 Ohio St. 2d 301, 315, 348 N.E.2d 342, 351 (1976). The
court stated that because only one true claim for relief existed, the case did not
fall within the parameters of Rule 54(B). It was not a multi-claim case, only a
case with several issues within one claim for relief.
204 Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St. 3d 92,95 n.3, 540 N.E.2d 1381, 1384 n.3 (1989).
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Another reason why the transaction definition of claim for relief is
compelled over various other definitions is because of the requirement
that before Rule 54(B) even applies, the prongs of R.C. § 2505.02 must
be satisfied.205 Under the part of R.C. § 2505.02 which most often is
implicated in Rule 54(B) cases, 206 a judgment cannot be final unless it
affects a substantial right of a party, determines an action, and prevents
a judgment.20 7 If one theory of recovery or one issue was considered a
claim for relief as they are under the first Henderson definition, 28 then
Rule 54(B) and R.C. § 2505.02 could not be reconciled. The adjudication
of one issue or theory would not prevent a judgment. Other issues would
be pending against the defendant and thus an order on a theory or issue
would not be final under R.C. § 2505.02. Thus, Rule 54(B) could not be
used.
Before 1989, Rule 54(B) allowed one party to appeal an order on one
of many portions of a case as long as certification was on the order.20 In
Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co.,210 a plaintiff landowner sued a pipe-
line company for damages and injunctive relief alleging eight causes of
action. All but one of the "claims for relief' 21' were dismissed on motion
for partial summary judgment, and the order granting the summary
judgment contained the required Rule 54(B) language. The court noted
that Rule 54(B) was purely procedural, recognized that orders had to first
be final under R.C. § 2505.02, but then stated that the trial court had
not abused its discretion in making the seven dismissed "causes of action"
immediately appealable under Rule 54(B). 21 2
In Alexander, there was no discussion of the meaning of claim for relief.
The court seemed to consider all eight assertions of rights as true claims
for relief. However, it is arguable that all eight causes arose out of one
set of facts, the laying of a pipeline. If so, only one true claim for relief
existed and Rule 54(B) should not have been employed. Alexander illus-
trates how the transaction definition of claim for relief, the broadest of
the Henderson definitions, 21 3 narrows the scope of Rule 54(B) because it
20. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 29.
207 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Baldwin 1988).
208 See supra note 185.
209 Noble Effort, supra note 29, at 2.
210 49 Ohio St. 2d 158, 359 N.E.2d 702 (1977).
2
,, The eight claims for relief were an injunction due to wrongful transporting
of dangerous liquids across the plaintiffs land in an underground pipeline, dam-
ages for lessening the values of land, accounting of revenues for the wrongful
use, restitution for unjust enrichment of the pipeline company, violation of an
easement terms, damages of land not in easement, nuisance for an ultrahazardous
activity, and damages for an explosion of the pipeline. Alexander v. Buckeye
Pipeline Co., 53 Ohio St. 2d 241, 243, 374 N.E.2d 146, 148-49 (1978). All the
claims except the one based on the explosion were dismissed. Id. at 244, 374
N.E.2d at 152.
212 49 Ohio St. 2d at 160, 359 N.E.2d at 702.
2,3 Henderson v. Ryan, 13 Ohio St. 2d 31, 34, 233 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1968). The
court stated that the transaction definition is the broadest and compels the pleader
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groups together parts of cases which previously were considered separate
claims for relief. Although Alexander sanctioned the immediate appeals
pursuant to Rule 54(B) of orders adjudicating one or more but less than
all distinct claims by one party in a lawsuit against another, after 1989,
it is not so certain that one party in a lawsuit will be able to appeal less
than all of separate claims for relief.
In the summer of 1989, perhaps spurred by the volume of Rule 54(B)
cases and by frustration 2 4 and confusion 215 with the Rule itself, the Ohio
Supreme Court decided three cases 216 which will make it "virtually im-
possible to take a Rule 54(B) appeal in a single party-multiple claim
case."21 7 This narrowing of the scope of Rule 54(B) arose because of the
interrelationships between the transaction definition of claim for relief,
the application of R.C. § 2505.02 to multi-claim lawsuits, and the defi-
nition of "action" as applied to R.C. § 2505.02.218
In Chef Italiano, a corporation sued Testa, among others, on four
counts. 19 It was by no means clear that the four courts arose out of the
same transaction. 220 The trial court dismissed two of the claims and en-
tered an order with Rule 54(B) certification. 221 The supreme court held
that Rule 54(B) was not applicable in this situation because under R.C.
§ 2505.02, Chef Italiano's action against Testa was not determined nor
was a judgment prevented because Chef could still prevail on the other
two counts. 222 There is a problem with this decision. If R.C. § 2505.02
214 This frustration was expressed by Justice Douglas in Chef Italiano when he
stated:
The jurisdictional issue in this case provides us with a perfect vehicle to
speak about an ever-increasing problem of orders emanating from trial
courts to the courts of appeals and to this court which are not final and
appealable but which the originating court has attempted to render ap-
pealable by including the so-called magic language of "no just reason for
delay" from Civ. R. 54(B).
Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St. 3d 86, 87, 541 N.E.2d 64,
66-67 (1989). Similarly Justice Alice Robie Resnic in a recent decision began an
opinion by expressing her frustration with Rule 54(B) cases. She stated that "[wie
must once again consider what is a final and appealable order pursuant to R.C.
§ 2505.02 and Civ. R. 54(B)." (emphasis added) General Accident Ins. Co. v.
Insurance Co. of N.A., 44 Ohio St. 3d 17, 19-20, 540 N.E.2d 266, 269 (1989).
215 To get a flavor for the confusion by the supreme court regarding the use of
Rule 54(B), see cases cited supra note 9. The majority and dissenting opinions of
these cases taken together demonstrate that the supreme court is as perplexed
as anyone else about the proper interpretation and role of 54(B). Dirty Tricks,
supra note 162, at 4.
216 See cases cited supra note 9. The contribution of General Accident Insurance
is that it reemphasized the often forgotten requirement that Rule 54(B) cannot
apply until the R.C. § 2505.02 has been satisfied. 44 Ohio St. 3d at 21, 540 N.E.2d
at 271. ChefItaliano and Noble confused the issues by applying the R.C. § 2505.02
rule in such a way that it is now harder to appeal a claim for relief. See infra
notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
217 Noble Effort, supra note 29, at 1.
218 See generally id.
219 Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St. 3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64
(1989).
220 Noble Effort, supra, note 29, at 4.
221 44 Ohio St. 3d at 88-89, 541 N.E.2d at 66.
Z22 Id. at 89. 541 N.E.2d at 68.
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always requires for finality that the single party plaintiff be prevented
by the order from taking a judgment against the defendant, then even
an adjudication of a separate true claim for relief would not be final under
R.C. § 2505.02. This is because judgments could be had on the other
separate claims for relief and thus Rule 54(B) could not operate. Two
judges dissented, and one stated that the language of the decision could
lead to the conclusion that the trial court must dispose of all the claims
in a lawsuit before an order can be final and appealable, thus creating a
result inconsistent with the plain language of the rule.223
It would seem Chef Italiano construed "action" in R.C. § 2505.02 to
mean entire bundle of claims for relief that Chef Italiano had against
Testa. 224 This interpretation suggests that claims for relief, even if sep-
arate and distinct, cannot ever be made final and appealable as Rule
54(B) intended in certain instances because R.C. § 2505.02 could not be
satisfied until the adjudication of all the claims against one party.
"Action" in R.C. § 2505.02 for the purposes of Rule 54(B) should not be
defined as the entire lawsuit. Rather, "action" in this context should itself
refer to a separate and distinct branch of a case so that less than all of
the claims for relief in a case can become final. For example, in Noble v.
Colwell, a majority held that if Rule 54(B) language had been added to
the order dismissing plaintiffs claim but leaving defendant's counter-
claim, the order would have been final and appealable because under R.C.
§ 2505.02 the plaintiff was foreclosed from obtaining a judgment against
the defendant. 225 The majority must have viewed "action" in R.C. §
2505.02 not as the entire case but as distinct parts of the case, namely
the claim being one action and the counterclaim being another action. 226
The confusion arising out of Noble is that while it theoretically suggests
Rule 54(B) applies to counterclaims, it also suggests that because a claim
and counterclaim arose out of the same set of operative facts, they would
constitute only one claim for relief and, therefore, adjudication of one
would not qualify for certification. 227 Two concurring justices agreed that
Rule 54(B) would not apply in such a case.223 A claim and a counterclaim
do arise out of the same set of operative facts. However, one set of operative
facts, if they produce distinct recoveries rather than just different issues
or theories of entitlement, can create more than one claim for relief.229
2
1
3 Id. at 91, 541 N.E.2d at 70. Chief Justice Moyer stated, "I cannot concur in
the opinion because parts of it could be construed to virtually eliminate an appeal
pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B)." Id.
224 Noble Effort, supra, note 29, at 5.
225 Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St. 3d 92, 95, 540 N.E.2d 1381, 1384 (1989).
226 Noble Effort, supra, note 29, at 5.
227 44 Ohio St. 3d at 97 n.7, 540 N.E.2d at 1385 n.7.
218 Id. at 98-100, 540 N.E.2d at 1386-88. Justice Douglas declared that this
case had nothing to do with Rule 54(B) and Justice Resnick agreed it had no
application. Id. The perplexity of the 1989 Rule 54(B) cases is compounded further
by yet another justice's, Justice Holmes, concurring statements that 54(B) was
applicable because more than one claim for relief existed. Id. at 98, 540 N.E.2d
at 1386.
219 See sources cited supra note 194.
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In the situation where there is a claim and a counterclaim, two individuals
have distinct, separate rights of recovery so that concluding that a claim
and a counterclaim are only one claim for relief is too restrictive. The
better view is that when more than one party has rights arising out of
one transaction, each party has a separate claim for relief. If other safe-
guards such as the transaction definition of claim for relief as applied to
one party which prevents any intertwined issues from being separately
appealed and proper certification requirements are utilized, there is no
danger of wholesale appeals under Rule 54(B). Something has to be done
to resolve the misapplications and misconceptions regarding Ohio Civil
Rule 54(B), but foreclosing its use altogether, as the supreme court seems
to want to do23° is no solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Proposed Amendment of Ohio Rule 54(B)
1. The New Rule
The problems caused by the misinterpretation and resulting misappli-
cation of Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 54(B), the sheer number of cases
which are appealed to Rule 54(B), 231 and the apparent inability of the
courts to alleviate the confusion surrounding the rule indicate that it is
time for Rule 54(B) to be amended. Changes to the rule would clarify its
meaning and help create uniformity in its application. The author's pro-
posed amendment to Rule 54(B) states:
54(B)(1) Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when mul-
tiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment on one
which is otherwise final under R.C. § 2505.02 as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only when there is no just reason for delay
and only on an entry of such express determination and the reasons there-
fore upon the judgment order. In absence of such determination and the
reasons therefore, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or fewer than all the rights
and liabilities of all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any
of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
23 Noble Effort, supra, note 29 at 6.
23 There has been much litigation on the application Rule 54(B). A LEXIS
search in December, 1989 under the phrase "54 w/3 b and final appealable order"
conducted for each year from 1970 through 1989 revealed 586 cases.
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54(B)(2) Procedures in lieu of an express determination of no just reason
for delay in a multi-claim or multi-party action.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action or when
there are multiple parties involved and there is an otherwise appealable
order pursuant to R.C. § 2505.02 on less than all the claims or less than
all the parties but there is a reason for delay in entering final judgment
as to the partial orders, the court shall place upon the judgment entry that
the cause is continued and the reasons therefore.
54(B)(3) For the purposes of this rule, a claim for relief is a transaction
or occurrence arising out of one set of operative facts. A claim for relief
may consist of many issues or many theories of recovery, but only an
adjudication of an entire claim for relief is subject to the operation of this
rule.
54(B)(4) For the purposes of this rule, "action" in R.C. § 2505.02 does
not refer to an entire lawsuit, but to a distinct branch thereof.
2. Justification for Proposed Changes
The proposed modifications to Rule 54(B)(1) would clarify some of the
54(B) problems mentioned in this note. Although the definition of judg-
ment in 54(A)232 includes a reference to R.C. § 2505.02, the addition of
the words "on one which is otherwise final under R.C. § 2505.02" to Rule
54(B) will leave no doubt that an order on part of a case must conform
to both R.C. § 2505.02 and Rule 54(B), thus eliminating-at least in the
minds of those who carefully read the rule -the previous erroneous belief
that Rule 54(B) alone made a partial order final and appealable. Ex-
panding the language "only upon an express determination that there is
no just reason for delay"' 33 into a two-step process of first deciding the
reasons for rendering a partial order final and then entering that deter-
mination on the judgment entry emphasizes to the court that it must
make a conscious decision based on rational reasoning and will help
decrease any temptation to add the certification language as a mere ac-
commodation to counsel or as a routine. Requiring reasons for certification
to be given on the judgment entry also facilitates the appellate courts'
review of Rule 54(B) cases.
The addition of 54(B)(2) to the rule is to help decrease the now abundant
number of nonfinal judgments which parties nevertheless appeal and to
aid the appellate courts in deciding whether the trial judge abused his
discretion by not adding certification. If the trial court enumerates its
reasons for refusing to add the Rule 54(B) language, attorneys will rec-
ognize when it is not appropriate to appeal, thus cutting down on the
volume of cases. The "reasons requirement" will also prevent routine use
of Rule 54(B) by trial judges when its use is not warranted.
23
2 OHIo R. Civ. P. 54(A).
133 OHIO R. CIv. P. 54(B).
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The perplexing problem of what constitutes an appealable claim for
relief could be clarified by the addition of 54(B)(3) and 54(B)(4). This is,
of course, assuming that these are the desired definitions. However, be-
cause of the many understandings of "claim for relief" and the confusion
created by Accident Insurance, Chef Italiano, and Noble, 34 54(B)(3) and
54(B)(4) should not be added at this time. On the one hand, the transaction
definition of claim for relief prevents an appellant from appealing every
little issue in a case. On the other hand, coupled with the R.C. § 2505.02
requirement that an order must determine an action and prevent a judg-
ment, the transaction definition has greatly narrowed the scope of Rule
54(B). The proper balance between the policy against piecemeal appeals
and the prevention of injustice caused by delayed appeals must be re-
defined. The best solution in this regard is for the supreme court to re-
convene the Rules Advisory Committee 235 to study the mechanics of Rule
54(B) as applied to multi-claim actions. In fact, whether or not the afore-
mentioned proposed changes are adopted, the Rules Advisory Committee
should study the entire operation of Rule 54(B) and make the modifica-
tions it deems necessary to fulfill the purpose 236 of Rule 54(B) before the
supreme court, weary of Rule 54(B) cases, follows its trend in General
Accident Insurance, Chef Italiano, and Noble23 7 and completely forecloses
the possibility of appealing partial orders.
Action must be taken now. Only careful analysis and modification of
Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 54(B) can prove wrong the prediction of one
noted expert in civil procedure who declared that the confusion surround-
ing Rule 54(B) "will not be resolved for at least another generation.
' 23 8
DIANE S. LEUNG
.4 See supra notes 214-30 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
-6 See supra notes 23-47 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 9.
m Dirty Tricks, supra note 162, at 4.
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